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abstract In this paper, I seek to explain Hegel’s view that his “logic” replaces
metaphysics. I argue that Hegel’s discussion of logical forms of judgment and
syllogism in book III of The Science of Logic is meant to be the foundation of his reformation of metaphysics. Implicit in Hegel’s discussion of the logical forms is the view
that the metaphysical concepts discussed in books I and II of the Logic supervene
on the role of subject and predicate terms in the logical forms discussed in book
III. Hegel thus has an explanation for the nature and signifcance of metaphysical
concepts that resembles Kant’s “metaphysical deduction.” In addition to illustrating
the dependence of metaphysics on logic, the present interpretation provides a new
picture of the structure of Hegel’s Logic that emphasizes the explanatory priority of
its Doctrine of the Concept.
keywords Hegel, Science of Logic, logic, metaphysics, supervenience, Kant, rationalism
Logic is to us a natural metaphysic. Anyone who thinks, has it. (GW 23:1, 19)

1. introduction
as is commonly recognized, only a small portion of Hegel’s Science of Logic looks
anything like a logic in the normal sense, namely, a work that considers forms of
judgment and rules of inference. For this reason, when Hegel says that his Logic 1
“replaces” or “coincides” with metaphysics,2 this apparently does not imply that
1
I will use ‘Logic’ in general to refer to the combined project of The Science of Logic (the “Greater
Logic”) and the Encyclopedia Logic (the “Lesser Logic”). These will be cited as SL and EL respectively.
2
E.g. “Thus logic coincides with metaphysics, the science of things grasped in thoughts that used to
be taken to express the essentialities of the things” (W 8:81/EL §24). “If we look at the fnal shape in
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formal or informal logic, or a special kind of “dialectical logic,” is supposed to
replace metaphysics.3 Indeed, when we consider the contents of The Science of Logic
superfcially, the air of paradox over this “logic” replacing metaphysics should
diminish considerably. For the frst part of Hegel’s Logic, the so-called Objective
Logic, is intended transparently as a critical account of the most general pure
concepts. As Hegel himself avows, this project largely coincides with what was then
called “ontology” in the rationalist tradition of Christian Wolff and Alexander
Baumgarten.4 Namely, Hegel’s Logic treats many of the same pure concepts as
traditional metaphysics, so much so that it has been rightly claimed “there is hardly
a single category to be found [in Hegel’s Logic] which Wolff had not discussed—in
his own way, of course—in his Ontology.”5 It is of course possible to “replace” one
thing with more of the same kind. But presumably Hegel intends such claims about
the replacement of metaphysics to mean something more than that he offers a
different and superior system of metaphysical concepts in the traditional sense.6
However, the specifcally logical dimension of Hegel’s Logic has not typically
been brought to bear on this issue. Indeed, it has been so neglected that the
question of the connection of the Logic to metaphysics has been frequently reduced
to the question of the relation of “thought” and “being.”7 This tendency poses the
problem of Hegel’s metaphysics not as internal to Hegel’s frst-level argumentation
in the Logic, but at a second level. Here, Hegel’s metaphysics is supposed to consist
in his view about how the conceptual work of the Logic relates to the world or
“being” outside of it.8 Hegel’s metaphysics is, as it were, about, not in, the Logic.
Taking as given Hegel’s internal conceptual arguments, is he “ambitious” or
the elaboration of this science, then it is ontology which objective logic most directly replaced in the
frst instance, that is, the part of metaphysics intended to investigate the nature of ens in general (and
ens comprises within itself both being and essence, a distinction for which the German language has
fortunately preserved different expressions)” (W 5:61/SL 42). Throughout the article, emphasis is in
the original unless otherwise noted.
3
See Beiser, Hegel, 161–62; Pippin, Shadows, 69–70; and Redding, “Role.”
4
See the second quotation in note 2 above.
5
Erdmann, Leibnitz und die Entwicklung, 289. (This and other translations from German secondary
literature are my own.) Bubner similarly writes that Hegel’s Logic is designed “to provide an intrinsically coherent and interconnected articulation of the totality of all previously generated concepts [of
metaphysics]. Hegel’s Logic thus methodologically reinterprets the entire history of metaphysics” (Innovations
of Idealism, 66).
6
Cf. Pippin’s remarks on “replacing” or “taking the place of” in Shadows, 128n56.
7
See especially Houlgate, Opening, chap. 6. Redding treats the problem of logic and ontology in
Hegel as one of determining “content” from the logical resources of negation in particular: “Hegel’s
task is to, in some sense, derive what is taken to be his organic metaphysics from the immanent development
of a content for logic” (“Relation,” 159, emphasis added). It is objective conceptual content that stands
in for “ontology” on Redding’s view: “Such would be Hegel’s starting point, and the task of getting
an ontology out of logic would proceed by a process of making such initially indeterminate content
determinate” (“Relation,” 151). Redding does not mean by ‘content’ here what I will call “logical
content” below. Nor does this use of ‘ontology’ map on to the pre-Kantian rationalist conception.
8
See Houlgate, Opening, 120–26; Redding, “Relation,” 164. The same could be said of Pippin’s
earlier “antirealistic” approach in Hegel’s Idealism: “Hegel also states that reality is the developing Notion, and this certainly suggests a kind of contemporary antirealism, a relativization of truth claims to
the Hegelian (Notional) equivalent of something like warranted assertability, or provability, or membership in an ideal theory” (99). Namely, Pippin has also tended to locate the metaphysical problem
of Hegel’s Logic in the relation of thought and being, only to emphasize in various ways how Hegel’s
account of conceptuality obviates any ultimate gap between it and reality.
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“modest” about the objective signifcance of this system of concepts? So runs the
debate. One gets the impression that Hegel’s metaphysics is, after all, a matter of
his temperament, since the same conceptual content could appear unchanged
within either an ambitious or modest project. And since this way of framing the
debate concerns the external signifcance of the Logic as a whole, it does not shed
much light on the specifc relevance of logic to metaphysics within the work.
Though the consensus that Hegel’s Logic is not meant as a normal work of logic
is correct enough, it has led to a marginalization of the portion of the work that
deals explicitly with logical forms. This has been a missed opportunity to explain
Hegel’s unique conception, not only of logic, but of metaphysics as well. As I hope
to show, Hegel’s treatment of logical forms contains an argument, internal to the
work, about the relationship of logic in a more ordinary sense and metaphysical
concepts. I wish to show how Hegel’s claim that logic replaces metaphysics can
be explained by considering the relation between the transparently metaphysical
concepts of the Logic and the transparently logical ones. Hegel discusses, and
usually criticizes, transparently metaphysical concepts in the “Objective Logic,”
the Doctrine of Being and the Doctrine of Essence. These are concepts such as
<being>, <quality>, <quantity>, <essence>, <appearance>, and <ground>.9 Logical
concepts and forms are discussed in the frst part of the “Subjective Logic,” or the
Doctrine of the Concept (Begriffslogik).10 Here one fnds discussion of topics like
conceptual universality, disjunctive judgments, and analogical syllogisms. The two
main divisions of the Logic may appear not to have much in common. Yet Hegel
says a number of things that suggest that the Begriffslogik plays a foundational
role with respect to the Doctrines of Being and Essence. In what follows, I will
emphasize the signifcance of the logical forms of concept, judgment, and syllogism
for Hegel’s critique of metaphysics. I am not aware of a treatment that explains
the dependence of the Objective Logic on the Subjective Logic in this way.11 It is
the foundational role of these logical forms for metaphysical concepts (as well as
his belief that they are nevertheless “untrue”) that separates Hegel’s explanation
of metaphysics from those of his pre-Kantian predecessors. Thus, Hegel’s Logic
embodies a thesis about the logical “origin” of metaphysical concepts. To put the
thesis in a slogan, I will argue that, for Hegel, metaphysical concepts supervene
on logical forms. This thesis is “embodied” in the Logic because it is shown more
than told. It is the aim of this essay to tell how Hegel shows it.
9
Angled brackets (‘< . . . >’) indicate that a concept is being referred to. (See e.g. Anderson,
Poverty of Conceptual Truth, for a precedent.) The convention is important in many cases, since according to the reading adopted here, Hegel may be explicating a concept without being committed to its
referent. For example, a discussion of <property> may or may not imply a commitment to properties
so described. On the other hand, Hegel is not merely discussing the use of the word, e.g. ‘property.’
10
These terms for the Doctrine of the Concept will be used interchangeably throughout.
11
As Robert Pippin has recently remarked, “To understate the matter in the extreme: this book
[i.e. The Science of Logic] still awaits its full contemporary reception” (Shadows, 4). This holds especially
of the logical portion of the Subjective Logic, despite some good studies in recent years: see e.g. Hanna,
“Ontological”; Redding, Return, “Role,” and “Subjective”; Sans, Realisierung; and Schick, Wissenschaft,
“Mangel,” and “Die Lehre.” However, I do not think the relation between the logical forms and the
metaphysical concepts of the Objective Logic has been adequately treated. Gerhard, Frage, shows
how the discussion of logical forms is connected to “Objectivity” within the Begriffslogik, though she
does not devote much attention to the relation of the Subjective to the Objective Logic, as I do here.

274

journal of the history of philosophy 59:2 april 2021

The thesis that metaphysical concepts supervene on logical forms—which I
will call simply the “supervenience thesis”—has much in common with Kant’s view
that the categories can be derived from the forms of judgment, announced in his
so-called Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories. The affnity between Hegel’s
approach to metaphysics and this Kantian view has been recently emphasized
especially by Robert Pippin.12 However, in Kant’s case, the Metaphysical Deduction
leads to specifc claims about the connection of metaphysical concepts and
principles to the forms of judgment (combined with the forms of intuition). For
example, the causal principle is linked to the hypothetical judgment. Though
Pippin and others have drawn attention to the affnity of Hegel’s Logic with Kantian
transcendental logic, they have not shown how this connection can be explained
in fne, namely, that each metaphysical concept has its origin in a different logical
form. As far as I know, only Robert Brandom has attributed a similar view to Hegel,
though primarily in the context of the Phenomenology.13 In my view, it is in the
logical portion of the Logic that such a view attains its most systematic presentation.
I will begin by presenting some passages from Hegel’s Logic concerning the
general structure of that work (section 2). They claim in general terms that the
Doctrine of the Concept plays a theoretically foundational role for the rest of the
Logic. These passages provide an interpretative explanandum. Since I argue that
Hegel’s conception of logical forms explains the dependence of the Objective
Logic on the Begriffslogik, I then explain how Hegel’s treatment of the logical
forms does not amount to a general or formal logic, and that his conception of
logic is at odds with the traditional notion of general logic (section 3). Hegel’s key
innovation is his idea that every form of judgment and syllogism must be presented
as having some variety of “logical content.” In section 4, I argue that Hegel uses his
notion of logical content to demonstrate the supervenience thesis: the view that
metaphysical concepts supervene on logical forms. This implies that the treatment
of logical forms in the Begriffslogik is meant to explain the existence (though not,
in general, the correctness) of the metaphysical concepts of the Objective Logic.
In section 5, I offer a few representative examples of the supervenience thesis.
Finally, I assess the signifcance of the supervenience thesis for the interpretation
of Hegel’s metaphysics in general.

2. the priority of the doctrine of the concept
in hegel’s LOGIC
In this section, I outline a view about the role of the Doctrine of the Concept, and
especially its treatment of logical forms, within the whole of The Science of Logic. This
See Pippin, Shadows, 40, 62–65, 80–81.
Brandom claims that Hegelian philosophical concepts are “pragmatic metaconcepts” that
“play the special expressive role of making explicit what is implicit in the use and content of ordinary
empirical and practical concepts” (Spirit, 8). He elsewhere (i.e. “Metaphilosophical Refections,”
25–26) associates these pragmatic metaconcepts or “metavocabulary” with the project of metaphysics. Though Brandom does not present a Hegelian pragmatic metavocabulary systematically, his view
also suggests that for Hegel different kinds of logical doings—ways to judge or infer—would require
different metaconceptual—and so metaphysical—“sayings.” See Spirit, 103, 208–9. Stekeler-Weithofer
(Kritik, chap. 16) also offers a picture of the relationship of logic and metaphysics that resembles the
one here, though it is not defended exegetically.
12

13
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view responds to a series of passages that have been neglected by commentators.
It also provides a specifc explanation of Hegel’s claims about Kant as setting a
precedent for his treatment of metaphysics.

2.1. The Doctrine of the Concept as Foundation
In many places, Hegel alludes to the fact that the Doctrine of the Concept, despite
being the fnal part of the work, plays a special foundational role with respect
to the rest of the Logic. Though these passages are often obscure by themselves,
together they provide an important explanandum for the thesis I will defend.
Here are some key passages:
Now the concept is to be regarded indeed, not just as a subjective presupposition
but as absolute foundation; but it cannot be the latter except to the extent that it has
made itself into one. . . . Being and essence are therefore moments of [the concept’s]
becoming; but the concept is their foundation and truth as the identity into which they
have sunk and in which they are contained. (W 6:245/SL 508)
The concept has subjugated the spheres of being and essence to which, from
other starting points, feeling, intuition, and representation . . . also belong; it has
demonstrated itself to be their unconditional foundation [unbedingten Grund]. But
this is one side alone. There is a second side left to which this third book of the Logic
is devoted, namely the demonstration of how the concept forms within and from
itself the reality that has vanished in it. (W 6:263/SL 522)
The concept is the truth of the substantial relation in which being and essence
attain their perfect self-subsistence and determination each through the other. (W
6:269/SL 526)
It is precisely the Concept that contains [enthält in sich] all the earlier determinations
of thinking sublated within itself. . . . [T]he Concept is also what is utterly concrete,
precisely because it contains Being and Essence, and hence all the riches of both
these spheres, within itself in ideal unity. (W 8:307–8/EL §160Z)

These passages are in agreement that “the concept” (der Begriff) plays an important
role vis-à-vis “being” and “essence”: it is their “foundation” and “truth,” or it
“contains” them. Though one might try to fnd in the above passages expressions of
an emanationist metaphysic, I think it is clear in most of the above quotations that
Hegel is not referring to “the concept” as an entity, nor to “being” and “essence,”
taken de re. He refers (by metonymy) frst and foremost to the “spheres”14 of
the Doctrines of Being, Essence, and Concept, and the “determinations” that
make up these spheres. These passages thus claim that the Doctrine of the
Concept is theoretically foundational for the rest of the work, however things stand
metaphysically. It is in terms of theoretical content that the Begriffslogik can be said
to contain “all the riches” of the Objective Logic.
It is not obvious on the face of it how this could be, especially considering the
apparent poverty of the frst sections of the Doctrine of the Concept. Given the
blatantly logical content of these sections, it is more traditional to see the content
14
Some of the passages above do not use ‘sphere’; it is the translator’s interpretation. Yet Hegel
often uses this term in this way, so it is not an implausible clarifying insertion. See e.g. EL §161Z,
§165R; W 6:279, 312, 335. Citations of Encyclopedia material may include references to Zusätze (‘Z’)
from Hegel’s lecture material, or Remarks (‘R’).
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of the Begriffslogik as drawn from the riches of the Objective Logic. Let us call this
the continuity view. This approach sees the Subjective Logic as continuing the
same kind of metaphysical project as the Objective Logic. For example, on this
reading, the metaphysical concept <substance>, the fnal topic of Essence, presents
the high point of metaphysical speculation, corresponding roughly to Spinoza’s
system. The transition to the Begriffslogik is not an outright rejection or reduction
of <substance> to something else, but a redressing of <substance> in logical clothes.
The logical relations of conceptuality, on this view, are just better expressions of
the metaphysical relation of substance expressed in the Doctrine of Essence.15 On
such a view, the theoretically foundational role of the Subjective Logic holds only
because the concept (as an “entity”) is metaphysically foundational for substance,
and for the other “entities” described in the Objective Logic.
I think the continuity view underestimates the “critical function” of Hegel’s
Objective Logic.16 Hegel’s account of metaphysical concepts in the Doctrines of
Being and Essence does not in general result in a positive view about the nature of
reality, simply because his effort is devoted to challenging both the common and
sophisticated uses of these metaphysical concepts. The transition to the Doctrine of
the Concept is the culminating moment of this critique. This is why Hegel speaks
of the “reality that has vanished” (die Realität, welche in ihm verschwunden) in the
concept (W 6:263/SL 522). However, in contrast to the continuity view, those who
acknowledge the critical side of the Objective Logic often fail to appreciate the sui
generis constructive dimension of the Begriffslogik. The Doctrine of the Concept is
meant to “rebuild” the reality that disappears in it.17 The critique of metaphysics
in the Objective Logic is not therewith the end of metaphysics.
The constructive dimension is on display in another set of passages that provide
the point of departure for the present interpretation and that have attracted little
scholarly comment. In these passages, Hegel seems to be offering a further clue to
the nature of the theoretically foundational role of the Doctrine of the Concept:
In their relation to the two preceding spheres of Being and of Essence, the determinate
concepts are, as judgments, reproductions [Reproduktionen] of these spheres, but they
are posited in the simple relation of the Concept. (W 8:322/EL §171R)

15
Stern, for example, seems to hold such a view. Categories from the Begriffslogik, for him, are “the
highest determinations in [Hegel’s] philosophical ontology” (Structure, 58). Accordingly, “universality”
from the Begriffslogik seems to supersede ontological concepts from the Objective Logic: “Hegel begins
his analysis [in the Doctrine of the Concept] with a frankly realist and essentialist account of universality,
stating that the universal constitutes the ‘essential being’ and ‘substance of its determinations.’ . . . Hegel
defends the view that it is the universal that constitutes the real nature of the particular individual by
claiming that the universal determines what sort of being each individual is; and unless it exemplifed a
substance-kind the individual could not exist” (Structure, 59). Further metaphysical readings of Hegel’s
logical vocabulary include McTaggart, Commentary on Hegel’s Logic, 190; and Taylor, Hegel, 309, 313.
16
Cf. Theunissen, Schein. Other works emphasizing the critical aim of the Objective Logic include
Bowman, Absolute Negativity; and Cirullo, Critique of Essence.
17
The Begriffslogik’s reestablishment of categories of “immediacy” is a central feature of Theunissen’s argument in Schein. Rüdiger Bubner makes a suggestive allusion to a similar role when he writes,
“Now the Begriffslogik, as the Subjective Logic, was nevertheless right from the beginning silhouetted
against [abgehoben . . . von] the Objective Logic of Being and Essence, and indeed as the concluding
establishment of the complete logical consciousness of what was earlier already implicitly exposited”
(Zur Sache der Dialektik, 109).
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The relationship of forms such as concept, judgment, and syllogism to others like
causality, etc., can only establish itself within the Logic itself. (W 8: 81/EL §24R)
But all the same, what underlies this classifcation [Kant’s table of judgments] is the
genuine intuition that the various types of judgment are determined by the universal
forms of the logical Idea itself. Thus we obtain, frst of all, three main types of
judgment, which correspond to the stages of Being, Essence, and Concept. . . . The
inner ground of this system of the judgment must be sought in the fact that, since
the Concept is the ideal unity of being and essence, the unfolding of it that comes
about in the judgment must also, frst of all, reproduce [zu reproduzieren] these two
stages in a conceptual transformation, while the Concept itself shows itself to be what
determines the genuine judgment. (W 8:322/EL §171Z)

These passages make explicit something that, on the one hand, is perfectly obvious
to readers of the Logic. Namely, Hegel divides up his discussion of logical forms
in the Begriffslogik so that they “correspond” to the three Doctrines. The forms of
judgment and syllogism are organized as follows:
Doctrine of Being
Doctrine of Essence
Doctrine of the Concept

A. Judgment of Dasein
B. Judgment of Refection
C. Judgment of Necessity18
D. Judgment of the Concept

A. Syllogism of Dasein
B. Syllogism of Refection
C. Syllogism of Necessity
[Objectivity]19

Yet the signifcance of Hegel’s organization of the logical forms according to these
divisions is not immediately clear. As we will see, Hegel often unhelpfully speaks
of a mere “correspondence” between the logical forms and the contents of the
Objective Logic. However, in the last and most telling passage quoted above, he
speaks of an “inner ground” of the logical forms in the fact that the concept is the
“ideal unity” of being and essence. This suggests that he sees an explanatory relation
between the Objective and Subjective Logics, and since the latter is given priority,
it must bear the explanatory weight. Moreover, he claims that the logical forms
“reproduce” the content of the Objective Logic. So even though the Begriffslogik
has some explanatory priority to the other Doctrines, the content of the Subjective
Logic must largely repeat that of the Objective Logic, something again that is not
obvious on its face. And somehow this “reproduction” of the Objective Logic occurs,
at least in part, in the account of judgment. This gives us another explanandum.

2.2. The Kantian Precedent
The fnal passage above contains an important reference to Kant’s table of
judgments, which may provide a clue for Hegel’s conception of logical forms.
Hegel praises Kant’s “genuine intuition” in his determination of the forms of
judgment. He also famously endorses a Kantian picture of the relation of logic
18
“Thus we obtain, frst of all, three main types of judgment, which correspond to the stages of
Being, Essence, and Concept. In accord with the character of Essence, as the stage of difference, the
second of these main types is again inwardly divided in two” (W 8:322/EL §171Z, emphasis added). This
explains why there are four judgment types, since B and C are both assigned to the stage of Essence.
19
Why is there no “syllogism of the concept”? I contend that when the formal moments of conceptual form are suffciently unifed, there is no reason (other than, say, a methodological one) to
distinguish these formal moments. A complete syllogism just gives the structure of an object of a certain
sort. See Wolf, “Rethinking Hegel’s Conceptual Realism,” for an account of this view.
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to metaphysics in a report (Privatgutachten) to his friend Immanuel Niethammer
from 1812, the year the frst volume of the Logic was published:
According to my view, metaphysics in any case falls entirely within logic. Here I can
cite Kant as my precedent and authority. His critique reduces metaphysics as it has
existed until now to a consideration of the understanding and reason. Logic can thus
in the Kantian sense be understood so that, beyond the usual content of so-called general logic,
what he calls transcendental logic is bound up with it and set out prior to it [vorausgeschickt].
. . . [T]hose Kantian distinctions already contain a makeshift or rough version of [my
logic]. (W 4:406–7/Hegel: The Letters, 277, emphasis added)

Hegel’s avowed allegiance to Kant is striking here, though the passage and
its surrounding context are not as perspicuous a guide as one might hope. In
particular, the passage easily suggests a simple identifcation of Hegel’s “Objective
Logic” with Kant’s transcendental logic and the “Subjective Logic” with Kant’s
general logic.20 However, if one followed this tempting association strictly, Hegel
would be saying the opposite of what he says in the frst set of passages quoted
in 2.1. There he says that the Doctrine of the Concept provides the foundation
for the Doctrines of Being and Essence; but if general logic is associated with the
Doctrine of the Concept, he would be saying here that general logic presupposes
the Objective Logic: the Objective Logic would be the foundation of the Doctrine
of the Concept. Moreover, Kant published nothing like Hegel’s Objective Logic.21
Hegel could hardly be citing Kant’s authority for that precedent. Hence, this simple
identifcation of the two divisions of the Logic with transcendental and general
logic respectively is a dead end. As we will see later, Hegel’s notion that general
logic is “bound up” with transcendental logic calls the very possibility of a general
logic into question. A fortiori, the discussion of logical forms in the Begriffslogik is
not a general logic at all.
Hegel’s specifc debt to Kant’s reduction of metaphysics to “logic” requires
a better explanation. I propose we examine the “genuine intuition” that Hegel
mentions in discussing Kant’s table of judgments. For Kant, the reduction of
metaphysics to a “consideration of the understanding and reason” has its basis
in his derivation of the categories of the understanding—his metaphysics of
experience—from the forms of judgment. Combined with their connection to
the forms of spatiotemporal intuition, the forms of judgment constitute Kant’s
“transcendental logic,” a logic that includes content for cognition. And the pure
concepts of metaphysics are derived immediately from transcendental logic. In
the Metaphysical Deduction, Kant gives a condensed argument for this derivation:
The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment
also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition,
which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of understanding. The same
understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of the very same action through
which it brings the logical form of a judgment into concepts by means of the analytical
20
See Pippin, Shadows, 57. As Michael Wolff points out (“Science of Logic,” 74–75), Hegel says
the Objective Logic “would” overlap “in part” with Kant’s transcendental logic. The identifcation
should not be made too simply.
21
Kant’s lectures on metaphysics, of course, occasionally resemble Hegel’s Logic thematically,
since they follow the structure of Alexander Baumgarten’s Metaphysics. These lectures were not available to Hegel, however, and he has in mind a general feature of Kant’s view and not an isolated text.
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unity, also brings a transcendental content into its representations by means of the
synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general, on account of which they are
called pure concepts of the understanding that pertain to objects a priori. . . . In such
a way there arise exactly as many pure concepts of the understanding, which apply to
objects of intuition in general a priori, as there were logical functions of all possible
judgments in the previous table. (A 79/B 105)22

The details of Kant’s argument need not concern us. What matters for us here is his
conclusion that pure concepts can be derived from “logical functions.” As a result
of the association of pure concepts of metaphysics with the table of judgments and
forms of intuition, Kant can sometimes speak as if transcendental logic replaces
ontology, the domain of “general metaphysics.” He writes in “Phenomena and
Noumena,”
The Transcendental Analytic accordingly has this important result: That the
understanding can never accomplish a priori anything more than to anticipate the
form of a possible experience in general, and, since that which is not appearance
cannot be an object of experience, it can never overstep the limits of sensibility,
within which alone objects are given to us. Its principles are merely principles of the
exposition of appearances, and the proud name of an ontology, which presumes to
offer synthetic a priori cognitions of things in general in a systematic doctrine (e.g.
the principle of causality), must give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of the
pure understanding. (A 246–47/B 303)

There is a clear sense in which Kant’s transcendental logic renounces traditional
ontology altogether. Ontology is a consideration of the basic predicates of entia
or “things in general.”23 This project requires “being” to function as a count-noun
with certain universally shared properties. Kantian transcendental logic does not
provide an ontology in this sense at all, since it restricts our attention to “objects
of experience,” abandoning any a priori principles for objects outside that domain
(whatever they may be). Kant thereby undermines the absolute generality of the
scope of traditional ontology.24 On the other hand, Kant also shows how the a priori
concepts of ontology have a genuine use. In this sense, he preserves metaphysical
concepts by showing their legitimate origin in the principles of the understanding,
namely, in transcendental logic.
In his preservation of a role for metaphysical concepts, Kant offers a frst
approximation of the supervenience thesis I will attribute to Hegel. In Kant’s case,
metaphysical concepts supervene on the forms of judgment in transcendental
logic. The core idea of “supervenience” concerns the covariance of one level of
22
References to the Critique of Pure Reason use the standard A/B pagination. References to Kant’s
other works are to the volume and pagination of Kants gesammelte Schriften. These page numbers are
found in the margins of the respective English translations cited in the bibliography.
23
Cf. Meier: “We see therefore from what we have learned that ontology puts us in a position to
know something about all possible things; and thus up to now ontology has been a science of all possible things without exception” (Metaphysik, §102).
24
Kant is of course free to say that he does have an ontology, so long as the change from the
traditional concept is thoroughly clarifed. See Kant, Metaphysik Mrongovius, 29:784. But see: “thus the
science of all basic concepts and basic propositions upon which all of our pure cognitions of reason
rest is ontology. But this science will not be properly called ontology. For to have a thing in general
as an object is as much as to have no object and to treat only of a cognition, as in logic” (Metaphysik
Mrongovius, 29:786).
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a thing with something of another level: roughly, ψ-things supervene on ϕ-things
if any variance in the ψ-way-things-are depends on a coordinate variance in the
ϕ-way-things-are (where ϕ and ψ are not intensionally identical).25 According to
a common application of the term, the mind-way-things-are supervenes on the
brain-way-things-are.26 This is a one-directional relation of dependency, and it is
thus different from identity in a standard sense. The brain-way is not the same as
the mind-way. They have different properties. All the same, the brain-properties
“fx” what mind-properties there may be. There cannot be a change in the mind
without a coordinate change in the brain.27
In Kant’s view, metaphysical concepts are one-directionally dependent on forms
of judgment in transcendental logic in a similar way. To have the table of categories,
all you need is the table of judgments along with the forms of intuition—not vice
versa. Moreover, the dependence of the categories on transcendental logic is
exhaustive. To understand <substance>, you must understand the role of the subjectterm in judgments of experience, with their necessary temporal determinations.28
To understand <accident>, you must understand the predicate-term in the same
type of judgment. The “natures” of substancehood and accidenthood contain
nothing beyond the judgmental role on which they supervene. The forms of
judgments “fx the facts” about these categories. Further metaphysical speculation
would simply miss the point.29
The supervenience thesis gives Kant a procedure for grounding every legitimate
metaphysical concept. Each must be shown to depend on a principle whose basis
lies in a form of judgment in transcendental logic. Hegel’s specifc reference to
Kant’s table of judgments, and the “genuine intuition” contained therein, gives us
reason to expect Kant’s infuence on this point. Moreover, the precedent of Kant’s
supervenience thesis can explain the theoretical priority of the Doctrine of the
Concept suggested in 2.1. While it is common to suppose that Hegel’s metaphysics
is Kantian in spirit, the supervenience thesis demands that metaphysical concepts
also be tied to the “letter” of transcendental logic. If Hegel follows Kant on this
score, his metaphysical concepts must be more closely tied to logical forms—not
simply “thought” or “thinking”—than is usually appreciated. I will try to show that
Hegel does follow Kant on this point, though with a crucially different conception
of “transcendental logic.” It is through a fne-grained connection of metaphysical
See McLaughlin and Bennett, “Supervenience,” for a useful summary. By excluding cases of
intensional identity, I only mean to set aside cases where covariance would be trivial.
26
Cf. Kim, Mind in a Physical World, 5–15.
27
Thanks to Josh Mund for suggesting important corrections to this paragraph.
28
E.g. “Likewise the proposition ‘Nothing comes from nothing’ is only another consequence of
the principle of persistence, or rather of the everlasting existence of the proper subject in the appearances.
For if that in the appearance which one would call substance is to be the proper substratum of all
time-determination, then all existence in the past as well as in future time must be able to be determined in it and it alone” (A 185/B 228, emphasis added). See B 304 for the necessity of intuition for
the introduction of the logical relation of subsumption, crucial for the asymmetry of the categories of
substance and accident.
29
This is very near to Brandom’s claim that metaphysical concepts are “sense-dependent” on
subjective pragmatic categories. See his Spirit, 208–10. However, I am not yet convinced that the
sense-dependence is “reciprocal.” Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for recalling my proximity to
Brandom’s view here.
25
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concepts to these logical forms, I will argue, that we should understand Hegel’s
general claims about the priority of the Subjective to the Objective Logic.

3. hegel’s repudiation of general logic
To understand Hegel’s explanation of metaphysical concepts, his challenge to
general logic must frst be understood. I have already mentioned in passing that
Hegel offers no general logic and even challenges the whole notion. Once we have
a reasonably clear conception of general logic, the reason for this is not so obscure
as may be thought. Hegel’s challenge to general logic does not stem, for example,
from an adherence to an alternative dialectical or dialethic logic. Instead, Hegel
abandons the notion that logic can be represented without distinguishing between
“conceptual types.” Here I follow Michael Wolff’s reconstruction of general logic
as it was common to the syllogistic or term logic accepted by Aristotle and Kant,
despite their differences.30 The mark of general logic, according to Wolff, is that
its logical forms contain no terms other than concept words, and concept words
(unlike proper names, for example) can be used indifferently in the subject and
predicate place.31 Syllogistic forms require that terms play a neutral conceptual
role so that, for example, a middle term can be used frst as a predicate but then
as a subject. A purely general logic would contain only one unmarked variable
type, corresponding to concept words.
According to this conception of general logic, Wolff argues, Aristotelian and
Kantian syllogistic is general or formal, while Fregean (now “classical”) and other
forms of mathematical logic are not. The Fregean comparison may help this notion
of general logic become clearer. Frege’s innovation, followed by all subsequent
“mathematical logic,” was precisely to introduce a distinction between terms that
represent objects—proper names or individual variables—and those that represent
concepts—functions or predicates.32 This required at least a two-type system of
terms in a function-argument structure, namely, Fa. At its most basic, this structure
demands that proper names represent singular objects and predicates general
functions that can take many arguments. Such a structure is necessary for complex
logical quantifcation.33 Despite its many advantages for the construction of a
mathematical logic, Wolff argues that Frege’s innovation introduces nonlogical
distinctions that preclude it from being general in the Kantian sense.
See Michael Wolff, Abhandlung, §36.
“Syllogistic is formal and thus pure logic exactly in the sense that, as such, it neither makes use of
conceptual constants nor takes into consideration other interpretations for concept variables (so that
totally disregards the content of concepts). It therefore makes use neither of individual variables nor of
individual constants and hence prescinds from everything intuitive and non-conceptual, consequently
from all relations of concepts to objects” (Michael Wolff, Abhandlung, §36). ‘Concept word’ is a Fregean
term, used to contrast with proper names. Unlike proper names, concept words are connected “with
the indefnite article, with words like ‘all’, ‘some’, ‘many’, etc.” (Frege, Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel,
150). See also Frege, Frege Reader, 149–50.
32
See especially Frege, “On Concept and Object,” in Frege Reader, 181–93.
33
See Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, chap. 2, for a rich appreciation of Fregean logical
structure vis-à-vis the power of quantifcation.
30
31
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Frege’s logic is thus a “transcendental” one, if that means that some cognitive
distinction is made with respect to the variables appearing in its axioms.34 As
Wolff shows, Fregean logic must assume a nonlogical distinction between the
terms occupying the respective roles of function and argument. Though this
may amount to a critique of Frege on Frege’s own terms, it is only as damaging
as the aspiration to a general logic is a good one. Hegel thinks it is not. Without
assimilating Hegel’s view to Frege’s, we can see that Hegel lacks a purely general
logic for similar reasons; yet unlike Frege, he repudiates it deliberately. He also
does so by insisting on the importance of conceptual “types” in the representation
of logical forms.35 The result is his affrmation of what he calls “logical content.”
Our tendency to take for granted a postsyllogistic conception of logical form may
have prevented contemporaries from noticing Hegel’s pre-Fregean innovation,
not to mention its connection to his critique of metaphysics.36
What I call conceptual “types” are roughly what Hegel calls the “moments” of
the concept: universality, particularity, and singularity.37 These basic structural
elements of the concept are derived at the end of the Objective Logic (W 6:240/
SL 505). Though this is a controversial transition in the Logic, we can ignore
its justifcation for present purposes and treat <universality>, <particularity>,
and <singularity> as the new “primitives” of the Doctrine of the Concept. Hegel
sometimes discusses “the concept” in the singular, and he claims that all three
moments are fully identical in “the concept” thus designated. Stated simply: the
structure of conceptuality as such can be seen equally as one of universality (a whole
“conceptual space”), its constitutive particular concepts, or as a structure of singular
objects represented by the concept.38 This unifed dimension of these moments
need not (mercifully) detain us here, however. What is important for now is the
way these integral moments of the concept as such fall apart in a judgment: “The
immanently refected determinations [i.e. universality, particularity, singularity]
are determinate totalities that are just as much in an essentially disconnected
subsistence, indifferent to each other, as they are through mediation with each
other” (W 6:302/SL 550, translation modifed). The judgment represents the
moments of conceptuality as nonidentical. The judgment “has not yet restored
itself to the unity through which it exists as concept” (W 6:306/SL 552). In other
words, though Hegel contends that conceptuality as such “dissolves” the distinction
34
As far as I know, Michael Wolff does not call Frege’s logic “transcendental,” but he claims that
Fregean “arguments” correspond to Kantian intuitions, even if not spatiotemporal intuitions; see
Abhandlung, §36.
35
Bertrand Russell later attempted to produce a more differentiated type-logic in order to avoid
self-referential contradictions in “Theory of Types” (1908).
36
Redding, “Role,” 287–90, appreciates Hegel’s use of conceptual determinations to replace the
formalism of the Aristotelian syllogistic, though not (I believe) the connection to Hegel’s critique of
metaphysics that I will detail below.
37
Singularity does not represent a kind of concept, however. My use of ‘type’ is untechnical, so I
will ignore this complication for now.
38
“It follows that each of the determinations established in the preceding exposition of the
concept [i.e. the moments] has immediately dissolved itself and has lost itself in its other. Each distinction is confounded in the course of the very refection that should isolate it and hold it fxed” (W 6:298–99/SL
548, emphasis added). On this dimension of “the concept” as the whole of “logical space,” see Koch,
Evolution des logischen Raumes, 149–60.
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between universal, particular, and singular, these distinctions reappear in the form
of judgment.
Immediately after the quotation just provided, Hegel gives us a taste of what he
means: “As contrasted to the predicate, the subject can at frst be taken, therefore,
as the singular over against the universal, or also as the particular over against the
universal, or the singular over against the particular” (W 6:302/SL 551). Hegel
claims here that the two terms involved in a basic judgment can take on the
signifcance (respectively) of universal, particular, or singular. In the frst instance,
for Hegel, the judgment represents a singular subject that is characterized by a
universal predicate. Evidently, in such a judgment the subject and predicate, the
singular and universal, are not identical. Unlike the concept as such, therefore, the
judgment in this form expresses a “contradiction” between subject and predicate,
singular and universal (see W 6:310/SL 556).39
Hegel eventually classifes forms of judgment according to how they involve
singular, particular, and universal terms. His project is not mere classifcation, for
he thinks from these primitives he can derive the forms of judgment and syllogism,
unlike his predecessors who, he complains, listed these forms haphazardly.
Though Hegel’s derivation is signifcant, I will not attempt to follow it here, only
the principle on which the distinction between the forms rests. As Georg Sans has
noted, as a way of classifying judgments, Hegel’s approach is novel.40 In traditional
syllogistic logic, universal, particular, and singular qualify whole judgments, rather
than frst distinguishing the concepts variously involved in a judgment. Kant, for
example, thinks of all concepts as general or universal in form, and thus the
combination of concepts in a judgment does not involve a difference in the type of
terms.41 This is what qualifes his logic, according to Wolff’s account just described,
as general. While some have suggested that Kant’s conception of intuition also
prefgured Fregean logic,42 this prefguration falls squarely within transcendental
logic. Indeed, Kant explicitly states that in terms of general logic, singular terms
must be treated as if they were general (A 71/B 98).
By contrast, Hegel elevates the importance of type-distinctions in logical form
such that a general logic that ignored these types is altogether disqualifed.43
39
Apparently, Hegel believes that the “true” form of judgment would express the identity between
the subject and predicate. Judgments including an asymmetry between singular and universal evidently
do not express identity. Therefore, they are formally untrue or contradictory. See W 6:309–10/SL 556.
This feature of Hegel’s view shows the grain of truth in Russell’s charge that Hegel confused predication with identity (something, it seems to me, that could certainly be charged of Fichte, who took the
form of judgment to be A = B). The truth in the charge is that Hegel thought judgments should express
identity (to “restore again this identity of the concept” [W 6:309–10/SL 556]); it is unfair, though,
given his view that most forms of judgment fail to express this identity, which shows that he clearly
did not confuse the two notions. See e.g. Stern, Hegelian Metaphysics, chap. 2; and Rosen, Idea, 250.
40
Sans, Realisierung, 110–11.
41
Kant, Jäsche Logic, 9:99, takes universal and particular to mark a difference in use. However, in
context this seems to mean that this is not an intrinsic feature of concepts, but connected only to their
relations. Primarily, these terms are the quantities of judgment. See Jäsche Logic, 9:102; and A 70/B 95.
42
See e.g. Hintikka, Kantian Themes.
43
This statement should be qualifed. It is not that Hegel denies that a general logic could be
constructed symbolically. He was well aware of attempts at formalizing mathematical logic in his day,
including those of his own teacher Gottfried Ploucquet (see Redding, “Role,” 292), though these attempts may not qualify as general by Michael Wolff’s criteria either. However, Hegel seems to believe
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When he determines the possible forms of judgment (using the moments as
primitives), he claims that each has distinct “logical content.” He writes, “Since
logic is the science of the absolute form, this formal discipline, in order to be true,
must have a content in it which is adequate to its form” (W 6:267/SL 524). The
logical content is just the role that the “moments” play in a given judgment or
syllogism. Though Hegel does not offer a thorough discussion of logical content,
I think the notion just outlined can be recovered from his remarks.44 For, on
the one hand, he distinguishes logical content sharply from the “material” of a
judgment. The material of a judgment would be the specifc content that would
fll the place of variables. For example, “rooster” and “crows” are the material of
the judgment “The rooster crows.” Hegel rightly says such “material [Materie] is no
concern in logic” (W 6:388/SL 615). On the other hand, logical content is more
than the completely empty syntax of general term logic, for this would provide no
means of distinguishing one judgment from any other. (As I have just claimed, the
generality of syllogistic logic lies in its lack of such distinction.) Instead, the logical
content of a judgment is the implicit role of its terms vis-à-vis the formal moments
of universality, particularity, and singularity: “These are the determinations [i.e.
singular and universal] that constitute the truly logical content” (W 6:316/SL 562).
If we take the example just given, “The rooster crows,” we can ascribe two distinct
logical contents to it. On one reading, it contains a singular term characterized
by a universal predicate. It is this reading that could be expressed if it was used
observationally.45 This reading would conform roughly to the example Hegel
himself gives when he introduces the notion of logical content, namely, “the
individual is a universal” (W 6:268/SL 525). On another reading, however, it would
function not as an observation but a characterization of roosters in general. Here,
“the rooster” would be treated as a generic. The logical content would be that of
a universal term characterized by a universal predicate. This example shows how
the same linguistic item can function to express two distinct logical contents.46
Given the need to disambiguate logical content in this way, it is arguable
that one cannot understand the propositional content of sentences like the one
just given unless one implicitly understands how the terms are functioning with
respect to their logical content. Logical content is not imposed on sentences from
the outside; it is necessary for sentences to make sense at all. Moreover, it is not
reducible to mere “form” if that is to mean the bare syllogistic or term-logical

that no general logic can adequately represent the differentiated logico-syntactic structure involved
in basic human thought, which he thinks cannot be ignored in the representation of logical form.
See, for example, Hegel’s challenge to attempts to leave out natural language in the representation
of logic: W 6:294–95/SL 545–56.
44
Below is a more specifc and direct account of logical content for Hegel than I have found in
the literature. See the brief remarks of Pippin, Shadows, 85, which do not mention the role of the
“moments” in logical content.
45
Redding seems to see the perceptual context as determining the form of judgment: “To sum up:
in the context of acts of perception, a judgement will be thought of as having a logical form in which
a trope-like singularized universal inheres in a subject treated as an instance of a kind” (“Role,” 292).
I think we should see things the other way around. Judgments of perception are possible because of a
certain logical content that allows us to distinguish singulars from universals in the right way.
46
Here I am in agreement with Redding, “Role,” 288.

metaphysics supervenes on logic

285

form: A is B.47 Hegel insists on this explicitly: “This expression [i.e. ‘the singular
is universal’] must not be put in the form of ‘A is B,’ for A and B are totally
formless and hence meaningless names, whereas judgment in general . . . has
determinations of the concept for its extremes” (W 6:312/SL 558).48 If no typedistinction is introduced in logical form between singulars and universals, then
the two readings of the sentence above cannot be distinguished, nor could their
respective logical consequences; yet in terms of the basic subject-predicate syntax
of term logic, they are the same.49 For this reason, no judgment can be adequately
represented with merely empty variable forms, and “abstraction cannot be made
from” logical content (W 6:388/SL 615).
Since the formal moments are Hegel’s only “building blocks” for the forms of
judgment,50 every judgment must be explained as having logical content in some
way: every form of judgment should be in some way an iteration, combination,
and/or qualifcation of the formal moments of universal, particular, and singular,
in the roles of subject and predicate.51 This much seems to be the basis of Hegel’s
determination and differentiation of logical forms proper. Yet this insistence on
the ubiquity of logical content amounts to a repudiation of purely formal, general,
type-neutral logic; for general logic assumes that abstraction can be made from
such logical content.52

4. the supervenience of metaphysical
concepts on logical content
Though not fully developed, Hegel’s notion of logical content, as we have seen,
suggests an interesting departure from the Kantian conception of transcendental
47
Hegel shows that he has a similar conception of logical form as Michael Wolff’s view of syllogistic logic. Hegel writes, “Nothing else is reckoned as the form of judgment except that the latter is
a connection of two concepts. But we have seen that these two concepts are not just the relationless
determination of a sum, but that they relate to each other as singular and universal” (W 6:317/SL 562).
Michael Wolff claims likewise that the basic form of syllogistic sentences, categorical form, “represents
a relationship between exactly two concepts which can be presented by logical constants such as, e.g.
‘every . . . is a . . . ,’ and to that extent possesses logical simplicity” (Abhandlung, §5).
48
The immediate context of this quotation is a discussion of syllogistic form, but the same applies
mutatis mutandis to judgment.
49
Thus does Hegel object to the defnition of judgment as the “combination of two concepts” as
it was defned by Christian Wolff (see Vernünftige Gedanken, 156–57); for “this defnition of judgment
ignores what is essential to [the judgment], namely the difference of its determinations” (W 6:306/
SL 553). I take “determinations” here to be a reference to the formal moments.
50
Hegel also makes heavy use of the terms “abstract” and “concrete” to further qualify the moments,
i.e. “abstract singular” or “concrete universal.” These terms do not receive an independent justifcation
in either the Objective or Subjective Logic. I will not question their legitimacy in this context, but they
certainly allow Hegel to produce further cases of logical content than would be possible from the mere
concatenation of the three primitives.
51
Redding’s formulation here seems apt: “Hegel notes that ‘every judgment is in principle also an
abstract judgment’ . . . the implication seeming to be that in making a judgment of determinate being
such as ‘the rose is red’ one simultaneously commits oneself to a higher-order judgment concerning
the categories exemplifed by the terms in the initial judgment. Thus to assert that ‘the rose is red’
is to implicitly assert the abstract proposition ‘the singular is universal’—an identity that is rooted
in the ultimate unity of the ‘moments’ of conceptuality—universality, particularity and singularity”
(“Subjective Logic,” 179–80).
52
I think it is preferable to say that Hegel repudiates general logic, rather than saying that he
thinks a “strict distinction between general and transcendental logic [is] impossible” (Pippin, Shadows,
104). However, this is somewhat a matter of how terms are fxed.
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logic and thus metaphysics. Convinced that general logic is empty of content, Kant
concludes that metaphysical concepts can adhere to the forms of judgment only
after adding something else: the forms of intuition. But Hegel does not accept any
empty conception of logic. In order to represent thought at all, logic must at least
distinguish the conceptual moments that constitute every judgment. Accordingly,
to Hegel the problem of deriving content from the logical forms does not seem
intractable from the outset. Nor do the forms of intuition play any signifcant role
in Hegel’s replacement for transcendental logic.53
It is the aim of this section to provide a model, in the form of a general
argument, of Hegel’s conception of the relation of metaphysical concepts to
logical forms or logical content. Hegel nowhere works out systematically the model
I will offer, though many texts point in its direction. I will restrict my attention
here to Hegel’s discussion of judgments, which should suffce for a more precise
conception of the relation of logic and metaphysics to emerge. What I say about
judgments should apply, with some important adjustments, to the other logical
forms as well: the moments of conceptuality themselves as well as the forms of
syllogism. The model, if correct, would encourage a general, and I hope fruitful,
interpretive program for Hegel’s Logic. Needless to say, that program cannot be
carried out here.
The previous section has authorized us to assert the following premise on
Hegel’s behalf:
(1) All forms of judgment have logical content.

We can now see that this is not a trivial premise, since, as Hegel understands logical
content, traditional syllogistic logic denies (1), or at least ignores its relevance.
It is Hegel’s belief in (1) that leads him to repudiate general logic. However, he
does not so much argue for this premise as demonstrate it by constructing an
exhaustive series of logical forms using his primitives. We will see some examples
of this in what follows. By showing that the distinction between types of judgment
relies on different respective logical contents, he shows that the “moments” are
necessary for distinguishing forms of judgment. If so, then a formal account that
elides distinctions of logical content is insuffcient.
Now I will attempt to show that in his discussion of the logical forms, the
following two premises lie in the background of Hegel’s account:
(2) All logical content has an “objective meaning.”
(3) Metaphysical concepts supervene on the “objective meaning” of judgments.

These will lead to our desired conclusion:
(4) Metaphysical concepts supervene on the forms of judgment.

53
For this reason, I still fnd curious Pippin’s continuing attempt to appeal to the inseparability of
concept and intuition to explain Hegel’s conception of logic and metaphysics vis-à-vis Kant. See Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism; Shadows, 82. The notion of logical content helps us avoid a reference to intuition,
even inseparably combined with concepts, in the explanation of Hegel’s metaphysics. Whether logical
content explains the applicability of logic to the world is a deeper issue, here unsolved.
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(2) is strictly textual and relies on a quasi-technical use of language. Hegel
sometimes, though not always, says that a judgment of a certain form has an
“objective meaning” or “signifcance” (objective Bedeutung) (e.g. W 6:307/SL 554;
W 6:322/SL 566; W 6:356/SL 591). Since nothing special seems to distinguish
the cases where he mentions the objective meaning, I think we can assume it holds
in every form of judgment. The question is what this “objective meaning” is. (3)
is my attempt to elucidate the intended consequences of Hegel’s use of the term,
and it is the focus of my exposition.
Hegel’s most explicit account of the objective meaning of judgments begins with
this description of the most immediate logical content, “the singular is universal.”
He says of this form:
In this way, the start is made from the singular as the frst, the immediate, and through
the judgment this singular is raised to universality, just as, conversely, the universal that
is only in itself descends into existence [Dasein] in the singular or becomes a being
that is for itself [Fürsichseiendes]. (W 6:307/SL 554, translation modifed)

He then uses “objective meaning” to refer to this phenomenon:
This signifcance of the judgment is to be taken as its objective meaning and at the
same time as the true signifcance of the previous forms of transition. What is becomes
and changes, the fnite perishes in the infnite; the existing emerges from its ground in
the appearance and collapses; the accidents manifest the wealth of substance as well as
its power. . . . Now this transition [i.e. from the Doctrine of Being] and showing [i.e.
from Essence] has passed into the original dividing of the concept, and this division, in
bringing the singular back to the in-itselfness of its universality, equally determines the
universal as something actual. . . . But equally pertaining to this objective meaning is
that the said distinctions . . . emerge again [wieder hervortreten] in the determinateness
of the concept. (W 6:307/SL 554, translation modifed)

There is much here that exceeds the scope of my present exposition. What is
evident is that the objective meaning of a judgment pertains to concepts belonging
to the Objective Logic, and in particular to the relations between concepts in those
spheres. In the Doctrine of Being, concepts undergo “transition” (übergehen); in
the Doctrine of Essence, they “show” (scheinen) themselves in one another. Hegel
says that the objective meaning of the judgment, in which one term relates to
another, is the “truth” of these relations. This implies for him that the previous
conceptual distinctions “emerge again” in the Doctrine of the Concept, now
in their true form. The objective meaning of the judgment (and other logical
forms) is thus the way in which these previous conceptual relations reoccur. The
paucity of explicit references to the objective meaning should not diminish our
expectation of its importance.
Still, the above passage does not much explain the content of the objective
meaning of judgments. It should be useful to consider Hegel’s further analysis of
the same basic judgment type:
The objective meaning of the proposition stating that the singular is universal conveys
. . . both the perishability of singular things and their positive subsistence in the
concept in general. The concept is imperishable, but that which emerges from it
in its division is subjected to alteration and to falling back into its universal nature.
But the universal, conversely, gives itself a determinate existence. (W 6:313/SL 559,
translation modifed)
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This passage claims that a singular judgment in its most basic form, what Hegel
calls a “positive judgment,” expresses an objective meaning, and that this objective
meaning pertains to both terms involved in the judgment. The objective meaning
of the positive judgment pertains, moreover, to the logical content specifc to it.
In this case, the subject term is a singular, and this use of a singular term implies
“perishability” (Vergänglichkeit). The predicate is a universal term, and this term
subsists outside of the singular while also attaining determinate existence (Dasein)
in the singular.
In both elements of the logical content, some “objective” concept is attached:
<perishability> and <existence>. Though Hegel’s use of “perishability” may suggest
a kind of natural process, it is for Hegel frst and foremost a defning feature of
fnite things, entities in the category of “existence” (Dasein) from the Doctrine of
Being; it stems from the disunity in these things between object and concept.54
Yet here, Hegel sees <perishability> expressed in the asymmetry between subject
and predicate in positive judgments. I think we can make sense of this. The
singular term has, in these judgments, a potentially momentary usage. Most
clearly, the referent of the ‘this’ changes as the sentence is repeated (a point Hegel
demonstrates in the Phenomenology as well). Hegel’s example at this point in the
Logic, “The rose is red,” is evidently meant to be taken referentially, as picking out
a singular rose. Here, too, the referent of ‘the rose’ can change with the context,
and the predicates ascribed to it at one time may not apply at another. In this way,
it “perishes.” The predicate, meanwhile, can be used to characterize a number of
such singular items. It thus has “positive subsistence” (ihr positives Bestehen) even
if it depends on the singulars to achieve “concrete existence.” Simply put, it lasts
outside the context and applies to new objects even when the frst disappears.
Taken together, this logical content expresses a relation between two kinds of
objective “being”: a momentary singular existence (expressed by the singular
term), and an abiding universal subsistence (expressed by the predicate). These
objective categories stem not from additional theories attached to the use of terms
in judgment, but from the logical content of the judgment itself. Moreover, the
“objective” concepts (like <Vergänglichkeit >) expressed in this form of judgment
do not adhere to any use of singular terms (for example), but to singular terms
conjoined to predicates in a referential use of the positive judgment. The objective
meaning differs on the basis of the logical content of the whole judgment, not
simply the terms.
From this case, we learn that the objective meaning involves the connection of
metaphysical vocabulary from the Objective Logic to the logical content of forms
of judgment. However, what is the nature of this connection, or “correspondence,”
as Hegel sometimes vaguely says? More strongly than mere correspondence, Hegel
believes, I think, that the concepts of the Objective Logic, which appear again in the
objective meaning of judgments, supervene on the objective meaning, that is itself
implicit in logical content of judgments. This supervenience implies an “existential”
54
As discussed in the Doctrine of Being: “It is the defnition of fnite things that in them concept and
being are different; that the concept and reality, soul and body, are separable; that they are therefore
perishable [vergänglich] and mortal” (W 5:92/SL 66). See also W 5:142/SL 103. The root concept
<Vergehen> is a feature of <becoming> as such. See W 5:111–12/SL 80.
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dependence of the objective concepts on the logical content. That is, there would
be no such concepts of the Objective Logic apart from the distinct forms of logical
content, and the specifc concepts there are depend on the differences of logical
forms. If this sounds implausible, frst recall the clear evidence presented above
(2.1) that, though the Objective Logic linearly precedes the Subjective, Hegel
says in a number of places that the Objective Logic has the Subjective Logic as its
foundation. There may be many reasons why the Objective Logic should precede
the Subjective in the order of exposition, but Hegel is quite clear about the order
of explanation. My claim at present is that this order of explanation can be seen
not only in the broad outline of the Logic, but at the fne-grained level of logical
forms, such as the one we have just seen. Hegel’s view that the Objective Logic
rests on the Subjective Logic should be cashed out in terms of the supervenience
of metaphysical concepts on logical content. Unlike Kant, Hegel does not connect
this supervenience to the addition of the forms of intuition, since he thinks that
logical content itself is rich enough to imply an “objective meaning.” The variety
of logical contents in the Subjective Logic explains the variety of ontological
concepts available in the Objective Logic.
Some other interpretations refer to the correspondence between ontological
concepts and logical forms, but without explaining the order of dependence.
Discussing the form of judgment connected to the substance/accident distinction,
Paul Redding writes, “Retaining Hegel’s way of portraying the situation, however,
the logical relation of predication can be seen as mirroring the ontological relation
between a property and a substance: one thinks of the intension of the predicate
as in that of the subject just as the rose’s redness is in the rose itself.”55 Redding is
one of the few commentators who take the discussion of logical forms seriously.
But it is unclear from his account which way the order of explanation between
ontological and logical relations should go: “mirroring” here is noncommittal on
the issue. Do we use certain logical forms because of our independent ontological
views, or do ontological concepts, including those articulated in Hegel’s Objective
Logic, depend on certain logical forms? My concern with Redding’s formulation
is that it allows that something like predication could depend on an independent
ontological view.56
On the present account, there is a clear direction to the explanatory
dependence. The concepts of a substance/accident metaphysics, for example,
do not stand independently from a certain form of judgment, but result from the
supervenience of those metaphysical concepts on that form of judgment. Hegel
goes on to explain:
The subject, the immediate singular at frst, is in the judgment itself referred to its other,
namely the universal; it is thereby [somit] posited as the concrete—according to the
category of being, as a something of many qualities; or as the concrete of refection,
Redding, “Subjective Logic,” 181.
Though Redding would surely acknowledge that the ontological view would be a false one, as
Hegel frequently suggests that substance/accident metaphysics is absurd. In the nearby context, he
writes, “The subject without the predicate is what the thing without properties, the thing-in-itself, is in the sphere
of appearance, an empty indeterminate ground” (W 6:307/SL 554). Similar themes are developed in
the Phenomenology’s “Perception: The Thing and Illusion,” W 3:93–136/PS ¶¶111–65.
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a thing of manifold properties, an actual of manifold possibilities, a substance of precisely
such accidents. (W 6:313–14/SL 559)

Though the metaphysical concepts mentioned in this passage are discussed earlier
in the Objective Logic, they are now explained as adhering to the role of the subject
in the positive judgment.57 Those concepts supervene on this logical content.
(Though not conclusively, the “thereby” [somit] here may speak in favor of the
order of dependence I am advocating.) It would be psychologically inaccurate to
say that predication implies the belief in substance and accidents. I prefer to say
that the concepts <substance> and <accident> supervene on this form of judgment.
This allows that the ontological concepts depend on the forms of judgment but
does not imply that the development of these concepts is an inevitability, as it
would be if the belief already followed. Historically, it often took great thinkers
like Plato and Aristotle to articulate ontological beliefs, even though logical
contents were long in currency. Moreover, on my view, it is quite signifcant that
metaphysical concepts, rather than truths, supervene on logical forms. Hegel is
not using the notion of logical content to justify metaphysical claims or principles.
Indeed, it was precisely the error of earlier metaphysicians to use formal logical
principles as a sure guide to ontology.58 By contrast, in general, Hegel thinks the
form of judgments is “untrue.” So an explanation of how metaphysical concepts
supervene may be used to diagnose how metaphysical “untruths” arise. Since
Hegel’s account of metaphysical concepts in the Objective Logic is often critical,
this is a welcome result. The Objective Logic shows how metaphysical concepts,
once extant, are often intrinsically inadequate or dialectical. The Subjective Logic
shows how the inadequacy can be explained through their supervenience on
“false” logical forms.59
Thus, instead of allowing that metaphysical concepts are formed from an
independent view of the world and merely correlated with forms of judgment, I
wish to frame Hegel’s view quite differently. If the Begriffslogik is the foundation of
the Doctrines of Being and Essence, then we should construe the form of judgment
See again Brandom, Spirit, 208–10.
This is what Baumgarten does with the principle of excluded middle, for example, since he
interprets it frst in terms of entia: “Every possible thing is either A, or not-A, or neither (§8). Now,
what is neither is nothing, because it would be both of these (§9). Therefore, every possible thing is
either A, or not-A, or, for every subject, one out of each pair of contradictory predicates is suitable. This
proposition is called the principle of the excluded third or middle between two contradictories” (Metaphysics, §10).
59
One of the most thorough accounts of Hegel’s critique of the form of judgment in metaphysics comes from Chong-Fuk Lau (Urteilskritik, “Categories”). Lau interprets the problem in terms of
the “ontological assumptions” of the form of judgment: “The underlying concern of Hegel’s critical
examination is directed toward the ontological assumptions that come with the form of judgment. It
attacks the ontological dichotomy of substance and accidents resulting from hypostatizing the logical
subject-predicate asymmetry” (“Categories,” 96). However, Lau sees Hegel’s critique of substanceaccident metaphysics as rooted in an alternative “subjectivity-ontological monism” (Urteilskritik, 194).
Though I have not been able to elaborate on Hegel’s positive use of metaphysical concepts here,
appeal could be made to the form of the syllogism, which leads to an adequate use for metaphysical
concepts. Syllogisms can express the “nature” of things: “The nature of something [der Sache] is that
its distinct conceptual determinations are unifed in essential unity” (W 6:358/SL 593, translation
modifed). Given the proper role of the syllogism in supporting metaphysical concepts, I do not believe we need to point to a monistic ontology to explain Hegel’s critique of the judgment. However,
I cannot make the case here.
57
58

metaphysics supervenes on logic

291

as the foundation of metaphysical concepts like <substance> and <accident>.
This is because different forms of judgment each have different logical content;
and logical content includes some form of “objective meaning.” These objective
concepts depend on logical content, and not vice versa. Metaphysical concepts
supervene on logical content in that the full variety of metaphysical content stems
from the diverse role of terms in judgments.60
In case one is skeptical that Hegel could hold such a view, it is worth recalling
his words from the 1831 Preface to The Science of Logic. He writes,
The forms of thought are frst set out and stored in human language, and one can
hardly be reminded often enough nowadays that thought is what differentiates the
human being from the beast. In everything that the human being has interiorized,
in everything that in some way or other has become for him a representation, in
whatever he has made his own, there has language penetrated. . . . So much is logic
natural to the human being, is indeed his very nature. (W 5:20/SL 12)

As the argument of the Preface continues, it becomes clear that the “forms of
thought” are regarded by Hegel, as we have seen, both as contentful (so not merely
formal) and as (potentially) objective: some forms of thought are capable of saying
how things essentially are.61 Since Hegel evidently thinks the forms of thought
are also the source of metaphysical concepts, he here implies that metaphysical
concepts are also “set out and stored in human language.” This would be trivial
if it meant only that metaphysical concepts were contained in the vocabulary of a
language. It is a commonplace that metaphysical concepts often begin (at least
historically) as ordinary words. The claim has more weight if metaphysical concepts
are linked to language as used.62 And language as used comes in the form of
60
For some readers, it may be helpful to see a similar view put forth in contemporary terms by
Stephen Schiffer in “Language-Created Language-Independent Entities.” Schiffer argues that some
contentious metaphysical concepts like <property> or <proposition>, though not themselves linguistic entities, are discovered or invented through “pleonastic transformations” on linguistic entities. A
pleonastic transformation involves an expressive rather than substantive change from a frst-order
claim. Schiffer introduces the notion to show that there is nothing to be feared from a commitment
to abstract entities like properties. For from the claim that the ball is red, I can derive the property
redness through a pleonastic transformation. As long as one realizes that redness is just an expressive
transformation on one’s commitment to a ball’s being red, there is no reason to deny the existence
of properties. But there is nothing in this commitment to properties not implicit in the use of the
original sentence. For a further development of Schiffer’s view of pleonastic transformations, see
Thomasson, “Easy Ontology.”
61
See W 5:26/SL 16: “the nature, the specifc essence, that which is truly permanent and substantial
in the manifold and accidentality of appearance and feeting externalization, is the concept of the
thing.” Yet Hegel also thinks that isolated focus on individual concepts will often show them to be
faulty: “When the thought determinations which are only external forms are seriously considered in
themselves, the result can only be the demonstration of their fnitude and of the untruth of their supposed being-for-itself, and that the concept is their truth” (W 5:30/SL 19).
62
To this extent, I agree with Pippin’s recent emphasis that Hegel’s Logic is based in thinking and
not only thoughts (see Shadows, 20–21, chap. 3). However, Pippin believes that the movement of the
Logic depends on the role of self-conscious thinking in unifying the determinations of the Logic: “The
movement of pure thought is like a movement in a proof, on the assumption that the moves are inferences a thinker, on pain of contradiction, must make, and not merely formal-structural functions, as
in a symbolic logic” (Shadows, 132). By contrast, I think we can explain the relevance of “thinking”
simply in terms of the content implicit in judgments and syllogisms. See EL §19R, where Hegel states
that thinking (Denken) gives “laws and determinations” to itself. The content of logic “is nothing but
our own thinking and its ordinary determinations. They are also what we are most familiar with: being,
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judgments. I have argued that for Hegel, judgments come with different logical
content. On this view, if metaphysical concepts are stored and set out in human
language, it is because these concepts supervene on the variety of logical contents
involved in the judgmental and inferential acts of human speech.63
I am thus linking Hegel’s claim about the connection of “categories” or “forms
of thought” to language to his further claim about the dependence of the Objective
on the Subjective. For while it is true enough that the concepts of the Objective
Logic are, or correspond to, German words, only the Begriffslogik treats concepts
as they fgure in language as it is used: in judgments and in syllogisms. This
thesis adumbrates an interpretive program that I can only mention here, but not
complete: to determine for every concept of the Objective Logic its foundation in
the Subjective Logic. This program is implied in the truth of the supervenience
thesis. Short of embarking on a commentary, in the next section I will give a few
further examples of the thesis in action. The examples are rather unsystematic
because Hegel’s own references to the supervenience thesis are themselves
unsystematic. But from some relatively clear cases, I hope a pattern can emerge.

5. further examples of the supervenience thesis
Following the “positive judgment,” which we have already treated, Hegel moves on
to discuss the “negative judgment,” which begins with the content: “The singular
is not the universal.” There are a number of allusions to Hegel’s earlier treatment
of nonbeing in this section. Just as negation provides a limit to an existent (Dasein)
in the Doctrine of Being, so here the negation in a negative judgment delimits the
particular quality of a singular thing by denying certain universal properties to it.
The notion of particulars (delimited universals) depends essentially on negation.
After arriving at the connection of negation and particularity, Hegel again alludes
to the objective meaning of such judgments: “This judgment is according to its
objective meaning only the moment of the alteration of accidents, or, in the
sphere of existence [Dasein], of the singularized properties [Eigenschaften] of the
concrete. Through this alteration, the complete determinateness of the predicate,
or the concrete, emerges as posited” (W 6:322/SL 566, translation modifed).
While Hegel accounts for the concept <quality> in the positive judgment, he
here suggests that the concept <singularized properties> comes from the negative
judgment, since that logical content introduces particularity. This is signifcant,
since it follows a similar pattern that Hegel mentions earlier in the Objective Logic:
“Quality is the immediate determinateness of something. . . . The property of the thing
is, for its part, the negativity of refection, by virtue of which concrete existence in
general is a concrete existent” (W 6:133/SL 426). Thus, while the simple concept
nothing, etc.; determinacy, magnitude, etc.; being-in-itself, being-for-itself, one, many, and so on. But
this familiarity only tends to make the study of Logic more diffcult” (W 8:67/EL §19R). I think we are
“most familiar” with these concepts because of the way they can be involved in the differentiation of
logical content. See likewise Brandom, Spirit, 209, where logical content is treated in terms of pragmatics.
63
“They [i.e. forms of spirit] come up in the speech of everyday, mingled and wrapped in crude concrete
[instances], for example, in ‘The tree is green.’ ‘Tree’ and ‘green’ are what controls our representation. We do not in ordinary life refect on the ‘is,’ we do not set this pure being in relief, make it our
ob-ject, as philosophy does. But this being is here present and expressed” (EL, “Introduction,” xvi).
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<quality> supervenes on the role of the predicate in the positive judgment, the
concept <property> (which introduces a greater level of concreteness) supervenes
on the role of the predicate in judgments of particularity, which introduce logical
negation.64 A change in the logical content of judgments involves a change in the
relevant metaphysical concepts.
The positive and negative judgments are both discussed in “The Judgment of
Existence”; they show the supervenience of concepts from the Doctrine of Being.
Hegel later shows how the key concepts from the Doctrine of Essence supervene
on logical content in “The Judgment of Refection.” In judgments of this type,
the subject is treated as something “existing and appearing [das Existierende und
Erscheinende]” (W 6:328/SL 570, translation modifed), while the predicate is “the
essential” or “refected in-itselfness” (W 6:327/SL 569, translation modifed).
These, of course, are central distinctions from the Doctrine of Essence. Hegel
makes it clear that they are characterizations of the objective meaning of judgments
of refection (W 6:328/SL 570). Yet he suggests that these new objective meanings
of the terms in the judgment depend on a new logical signifcance of the subject
and predicate in them: “In the judgment that has now arisen [i.e. of refection],
the subject is a singular as such; and similarly, the universal is no longer an abstract
universality, or a singular property, but is posited as a universal that has collected
itself together into a unity through the connection of different terms” (W 6:326/
SL 568). Though judgments of refection can have the same superfcial form as
judgments of existence, they differ in the weight they give to the predicate. For
example, the “singular judgment,” even as a judgment of refection, has the same
basic logical structure as the positive judgment: “the singular is universal.” But
Hegel says that the singular judgment places weight on the predicate as something
essential to the subject, so that the logical content can be more correctly stated:
“this [i.e. singular] is an essential universal” (W 6:328/SL 570). The culmination of
this type of judgment is one in which a “kind” (Gattung) is predicated of a subject
(W 6:330/SL 571). Genus-concepts have a different logical relation to subjects
than predicates from positive judgments, Hegel contends: “The genus does not
inhere in the subject; it is not one property of it or a property at all; it contains all
singular determinacies dissolved in its substantial purity” (W 6:333–34/SL 574).
Only by this logical relation between genus-concepts and correlated subjects is
the metaphysical relation of essentiality expressed. Once again, Hegel maintains
that the new objective meaning of this type of judgment is connected to a change
in its logical content. Even subtle changes in the infection of logical content are
shown to have signifcance for the metaphysical content of a judgment.
In moving on to discuss “The Judgment of Necessity,” the next major division,
Hegel offers one of his clearest allusions to the connection between the account
of judgment and the Objective Logic. He writes, “The determination to which
64
One should note that, despite Hegel’s explicit mention of “property” (Eigenschaft), which is discussed in the Doctrine of Essence, it seems more ftting that <determination> or <constitution> would
be the supervenient concept in the Doctrine of Being following “quality” (see W 5:131/SL 95). It is
possible that Hegel erred against his own vocabulary here. However, I am not seeking to evaluate the
appropriateness of each case, only to show the pattern that Hegel thinks some metaphysical concept
supervenes on each logical form.
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universality has advanced is, as we have seen, the universality that is in and for
itself or the objective universality, which in the sphere of essence corresponds to
substantiality” (W 6:335/SL 575, translation modifed).65 Hegel again uses the
weak term “corresponds” to describe the relation between the Objective and
Subjective Logic. I think we are permitted to strengthen the connection by positing
the concept <substantiality> as supervening on the judgment of necessity. We see
this, I believe, as Hegel describes one of the subtypes of the judgment of necessity,
the hypothetical judgment. Hegel says that the hypothetical judgment connects
“two immediate, or externally contingent concrete existences” to each other with
necessity (W 6:337/SL 576). This sort of judgment entails several concepts Hegel
describes in the Doctrine of Essence:
The hypothetical judgment can be more precisely determined in terms of the
relationships of refection as a relation of ground and consequence, condition and
conditioned, causality etc. Just as substantiality is in the categorical judgment in the form
of the concept, so is the connection of causality in the hypothetical judgment. This
and the other relations all [sämtlich] stand under it [i.e. the form of the concept], but
they are here no longer as independent sides, but rather in this relation essentially only
as moments of one and the same identity. (W 6:338/SL 577, translation modifed)

Hegel says that causality is “in” the hypothetical judgment as substantiality is
“in” the categorical. This sounds stronger than a mere “correspondence,” as he
sometimes calls the relation between the Doctrines of Essence and Concept. The
hypothetical judgment explains <causality>.
Moreover, this passage authorizes us to generalize from Hegel’s explicit
references to the Objective Logic; he says that “all” (sämtlich) the relations of
essence stand “under” the form of the concept. Presumably, this means that the
possibility of assigning every concept of the Doctrine of Essence to some form
within the Begriffslogik is anticipated. Or in our terms, every concept from the
Doctrine of Essence (and Being, a fortiori) supervenes on some logical relation
within the Doctrine of the Concept. Thus, this small sample of cases seems to
indicate a pattern underlying Hegel’s Logic as well as his conviction about the
origin of metaphysical concepts.

6. conclusion
In the above, I have tried to show that Hegel’s account of logical forms, which may
otherwise appear as a tortuous derivation of forms of judgment and inference,
plays a signifcant role in Hegel’s view that “logic” replaces metaphysics. It is not
merely that metaphysical concepts are “forms of thought” (Denkformen) in the
innocent sense that they make up the most elementary structure of our conceptual
thought. This claim would not have been denied by the pre-Kantian metaphysics
that Hegel’s Logic is meant to replace. Instead, Hegel works out a more ambitious
attempt than even Kant’s to connect metaphysical concepts to an origin in specifc
logical forms. He can do this thanks to a richer conception of logical form or
Compare the Encyclopedia account: “The categorical judgment (‘Gold is a metal,’ ‘The rose is
a plant’) is the immediate judgment of necessity, and corresponds to the relationship of substantiality
in the sphere of Essence” (W 8:329/EL §177Z).
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content. Though the logical forms would be merely empty if the Kantian picture
of general logic held sway, Hegel feels entitled to ascribe this new signifcance
to the logical forms because he shows that the forms of judgment and inference
have logical content, produced from the varying role of singular, particular, and
universal terms within them: “This formal discipline must therefore be thought
of as inherently much richer in determinations and content, and also of infnitely
greater effcacy over the concrete, than it is normally taken to be” (W 6:267–68/
SL 524–25). Yet previous interpretations of the Logic have not much clarifed the
“infnitely greater effcacy” that the formal discipline of logic is supposed to have:
thanks to logical content, judgmental forms can be seen to express an “objective
meaning” that is the source of metaphysical concepts.
Rather than considering the question of Hegel’s view of the relation of
thought and being, I have here restricted my attention to a question internal to
Hegel’s Logic: the relation of logical forms and metaphysical concepts.66 Since
the supervenience thesis explains the origin of metaphysical concepts without
itself explaining which are true, answering the latter question does not suffce
to answer the former. Indeed, the supervenience thesis often explains precisely
why metaphysical concepts are untrue, or inadequate for an explanation of how
things are. Though we may be owed an account of how the “pure thought” of
Hegel’s Logic is able also to say how things are, I think there is a separate value
in exploring the conceptual questions, as done in this paper. For, if correct, the
supervenience thesis should hold despite interpretive disagreements on the
metaphysical “status” of Hegel’s Logic.67 For example, and at the extremes, it could
hold whether Hegelian thought (and thus logical content) is of squarely human or
Platonistic, or otherwise theological, provenance.68 Moreover, the present model
helps avoid the supposed confict between accounts that argue about whether
Hegel thinks his forms of thought are also forms of “being” or “any possible object
of judgment.” Both these options require that Hegel’s forms of thought be taken
at face value as being suitable for expressing how things are in an unqualifed
manner.69 But I have shown that embedded in Hegel’s account of logical forms is
a restatement and further explanation of his critique of traditional metaphysics
in the Objective Logic. This does not mean that Hegel sees no positive use for
Pippin, Shadows, 46–48, seems to make this identifcation of the two issues.
Hegel allows something much like this in his 1812 report to Niethammer. He writes that the
Denkformen he discusses “are independent of metaphysical system; they occur in transcendental idealism
as well as in dogmatism; the former calls them determinations of entium, the latter [determinations]
of the understanding” (W 4:407). In other words, the same metaphysical concepts can occur, and be
subject to criticism, regardless of metaphysical commitment.
68
My own tendency is to avoid transcendent entities in explaining Hegelian thought. See Wolf,
“Rethinking Hegel’s Conceptual Realism.”
69
Pippin’s recent claim that the Logic “is, or at least appears to be, something like an account of all
possible account-givings” (Shadows, 32) seems to assume that Hegel generally attempts to offer a positive
and correct account of account-givings. Likewise when he writes, “Since these metaconcepts [of the
Logic] are the forms of whatever can be truly said, and what is truly said is what is the case, they are the
forms of reality” (Shadows, 111). I see no evidence for the completeness implied in Pippin’s claims:
“all possible account-givings” and “whatever can be truly said.” Though Pippin acknowledges the critical task of the Objective Logic (e.g. Shadows, 33–34), I do not see how this acknowledgement squares
with his general characterization of the work, since it is unclear from his account how the Subjective
Logic would complete the task the Objective Logic fails to achieve.
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metaphysical concepts. Indeed, the goal of the Subjective Logic is also to restore
a proper use to some of the concepts of the Objective Logic.70 Nevertheless, the
critical side of his account prevents a complacent evaluation of metaphysical
concepts. We should not ask what the relation of thought to being is simpliciter,
but rather how and to what extent the forms of thought—now taken specifcally
as forms of concepts, judgment, and syllogism—are suited to express the truth.71
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